




Protection of accelerator equipment is as old as accelerator technology and
was for many years related to high-power equipment. Examples are the pro-
tection of powering equipment from overheating (magnets, power converters,
high current cables) of superconducting magnets from damage after a quench,
and of klystrons. The protection of equipment from beam accidents is more
recent. It is related to the increasing beam power of high-power proton acceler-
ators such as ISIS, SNS, and the PSI cyclotron, to the emission of synchrotron
light by electronpositron accelerators, and to the increase of energy stored
in the beam (in particular for hadron colliders such as the Tevatron, HERA,
and the LHC). This requires an excellent understanding of accelerator physics
and operation to anticipate possible failures that could lead to damage. This
includes beam and equipment monitoring, a system to safely stop beam oper-
ation (e.g., dumping the beam), and an interlock system providing the glue be-
tween these systems. The most recent accelerator, the LHC, will operate with
about 3× 1014 protons per beam, corresponding to an energy of 360 MJ. The
energy stored in the beams can cause massive damage to accelerator equipment
in case of uncontrolled beam loss, and a single accident damaging vital parts
of the accelerator could interrupt operation for years. This lecture will provide
an overview of the requirements for protection of accelerator equipment, in-
troduce the various protection systems that are being used, and highlight the
function of beam instruments for protection of the accelerator.
1 Introduction
Accelerators, as all other technical systems, must respect some general principles with respect to safety
and protection:
 protect the people (e.g., following legal requirements);
 protect the environment (e.g., following legal requirements);
 protect the equipment (the investment).
The term ‘equipment’ includes all systems of the accelerator that must be protected during all
phases of operation, with the accelerator operating with or without beam.
In this presentation the protection of equipment from damage or unacceptable activation caused
by beam losses is discussed. First, some principles for the protection of accelerators are presented and
then examples for machine protection from SNS [1] and in particular for the LHC [2] are given.
Protection is not only relevant during operation with beam. Without beam, protection of high-
power equipment must be considered. This is not the main subject of the lecture, however, a few exam-
ples are given:
 Superconducting magnets store a large amount of energy and there is the risk of a quench, either
induced by the beam, or due to other reasons, e.g., training quenches. The magnets need to be
designed and protected so that they are not damaged after a quench. The incident at the LHC
on 19 September 2008 demonstrated that the operation of a superconducting magnet system is
delicate [3].
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 Some equipment (normal conducting magnets, high-current cables, high-current power converters)
requires air or water cooling. In case of a failure in the cooling system the equipment needs to be
switched off.
Although there are quite a number of publications on issues related to machine protection, there
are only a few summary papers [4].
2 Definition of risk
Protection is required if there is some risk. The risk is dened as the product of the probability for a
failure multiplied by the consequences of the failure (e.g., damage to equipment), assuming that there is
no protection. Machine protection systems prevent damage to equipment after a failure. The higher the
risk, the more machine protection becomes important. Machine protection needs to be considered during
design, construction, and operation of the accelerator.
If a specic failure is considered, the consequences of the failure can be estimated, either in terms
of damage to equipment (repair requiring investment, e.g., in money), in downtime of the accelerator
(e.g., in days) and in radiation dose to personnel accessing equipment (e.g., in mSv).
In the estimation of downtime of the accelerator for repair, the availability of spare parts needs
to be considered. If the accelerator was operating with beam, radioactive activation of material must be
taken into account. It may be necessary to wait for cool-down of irradiated components to reduce the
dose before accessing the equipment.
The second factor entering into the risk is the probability of such a failure happening (e.g., mea-
sured in number of failures per year).
For beam operation, a list of all possible failures that could lead to beam loss into equipment
should be considered. This is not obvious since there is a nearly innite number of mechanisms for
losing the beam. However, the most likely failure modes and in particular the worst case failures and
their probability must be considered.
3 Beam losses and consequences
Particle losses in a material lead to particle cascades. The maximum energy deposition can be deep in
the material at the maximum of the hadron or electromagnetic shower. The energy deposition leads to a
temperature increase in the material that can be vaporized, melt, deform or lose its mechanical properties,
depending on the material and the beam impact.
There is already some risk of damage to sensitive equipment for an energy deposition of some
10 kJ (beam impact for a short time, say, a maximum of a few ms). The risk of damage to equipment for
some MJ is very large.
Equipment becomes activated due to beam losses. It is considered to be acceptable if beam losses
do not exceed, say, 1 W/m. Another principle is ALARA: exposure of personnel to radiation should be
As Low As Reasonably Achievable. If a further reduction of the beam losses below 1 W/m is reasonably
possible, this is recommended in order to minimize exposure of service personnel.
For accelerators with superconducting magnets there is a specic problem: even with beam loss
much below the damage threshold, superconducting magnets could quench. In case of a quench, beam
operation is interrupted for some time (ten minutes up to many hours) and this leads to downtime. In order
to avoid beam-induced quenches, beam losses are monitored and the beam is dumped if a predened
threshold is exceeded before a magnet quenches, reducing the downtime since the time to recover from
a quench is avoided. The damage threshold is far above the quench threshold, therefore this strategy




There is no straightforward expression for the energy deposition of high energy particles, since this
depends on the particle type, the momentum, beam parameters and material parameters (atomic number,
density, specic heat). Programs such as FLUKA [5], MARS [6] or GEANT4 [7] are being used for the
calculation of energy deposition (and subsequent temperature increase) as well as for the activation of
the material that is exposed.
Relevant parameters to be considered for heating and possible damage to material are the momen-
tum of the particle, the particle type, the energy stored in the beam, the beam power, the beam size, the
beam power / energy density (MJ/mm2, MW/mm2), and the time structure of beam.
In order to estimate the order of magnitude for possible damage:
 1 MJ can heat and melt about 1.5 kg of copper;
 1 MJ corresponds to the energy stored in about 0.25 kg of TNT [8];
 1 MW during one second corresponds to 1 MJ.
Radioactive activation of material is mainly an issue for hadron accelerators, it is less problematic
for electronpositron machines.
4 Accelerators that require protection systems
 High-power accelerators (e.g., spallation sources) with beam power of some 10 kW to above
1 MW. There is risk of both damage and activation. Spallation sources operate with up to (and
above) 1 MW quasi-continuous beam power (SNS [1, 9], PSI cyclotron [10], ISIS [11], JPARC
[12]). In case of failure the beam must be switched off as fast as possible. The time needed to
switch off the beam before damage depends on beam power, the type of failure, and the equipment
exposed to beam losses.
 Hadron synchrotrons and colliders with large stored energies in the beams. In case of failure the
energy must be discharged. In general, the beams are extracted onto a target that can withstand
the full energy stored in the beam. Safely dumping the beams can be rather challenging. This is
an issue for accelerators such as the LHC [13], HERA [14], the Tevatron [15], RHIC [16] and the
SPS [17].
 Linear colliders and other accelerators with very high beam power densities due to small beam
size such as the SLAC linac [18], the International Linear Collider (ILC), CLIC (Compact LInear
Collider), and the NLC [19, 20] (Next Linear Collider, a project that was discussed before ILC),
and FLASH [21, 22] (average power of 50 kW). For an accelerator like the ILC one beam pulse
can lead to damage. A citation from a paper any time interval large enough to allow a substantial
change in the beam trajectory of component alignment (fraction of a second), pilot beam must be
used to prove the integrity of the accelerator [19].
 Synchrotron light sources with high-intensity beams and secondary photon beams, where the pri-
mary beam, but in particular the intense photon beam, can damage equipment.
 Energy recovery linacs: as an example the prototype of such accelerators in Daresbury; one single
bunch train cannot damage equipment, but in case of beam loss the next train must not leave the
(injector) station [23].
 Medical accelerators: owing to the low intensity, there is no risk of damage to equipment. How-
ever, it is vital to prevent a too high dose to patients. The strategies and techniques to minimize
risks for humans are similar to those for machine protection.
For very short bunches with high current the beam induces image currents in surrounding equip-






Fig. 1: Damage to a copper plate by 450 GeV/c proton beams with different intensities
5 Damage by a 7 TeV proton pencil beam (LHC)
A simple approximation for the temperature increase in material for a 7 TeV beam impact is given in the
following example: for copper, the maximum longitudinal energy deposition for a single 7 TeV proton
at about 25 cm inside the material is Edep = 1.5 × 10−5 J/kg (calculation with FLUKA). The energy
required to heat and melt copper isE = 6.3×105 J/kg. Assuming a pencil beam, the number of particles
required to damage (melt) copper is of the order of 1010. For graphite, the number of particles needed
to cause damage is about one order of magnitude larger. More rened and complete calculations can be
made to determine real-world scenarios on a case-by-case basis, where the distribution of the impacting
particles and the details of the material and geometry are very important.
The design of LHC protection elements is based on detailed energy deposition simulations and an
assumption of the damage levels. A dedicated experiment was carried out to cross-check the validity of
this approach by trying to damage material in a controlled way with beam [24]. The impact of a 450 GeV
beam extracted from the SPS on a specially designed high-Z target was simulated for a simple geometry
comprising several typical materials used for LHC equipment. The beam intensities for the test were
chosen to exceed the damage limits of parts of the target, between 2 × 1012 and 8 × 1012 protons. The
transverse r.m.s. beam dimensions were about 1 mm.
The geometry of the target was modeled in FLUKA and the target heating was estimated. The
temperature rise was obtained from the energy deposition using the temperature-dependent heat capacity
for each material. The results of the controlled damage test show reasonable agreement with the simu-
lations. Zinc, copper and INCONEL plates were damaged at the predicted locations within the error of
the simulation, see Fig. 1. The transverse extent of the damaged area on the zinc and copper plates was
predicted to within 30%. The outcome of the experiment gives condence that beam-induced damage
limits for simple geometries can be adequately predicted with simulations.
One of the worst-case failure scenarios, an accidental release of the entire LHC beam energy















Fig. 2: Energy deposited in a copper target by a 7 TeV/c LHC beam with nominal intensity. Instantaneous impact
is assumed.
solid copper target hit at normal incidence by the full LHC beam by carrying out three-dimensional
energy deposition calculations and two-dimensional numerical simulations of the hydrodynamic and
thermodynamic response at different longitudinal positions in the target.
If instantaneous energy deposition were assumed, the energy density deposited in the material
would exceed the energy that is required for vaporization by several orders of magnitude, see Fig. 2.
However, the beam energy is deposited for 86 µs, long enough to change the density of the target material.
This density change strongly affects the energy deposition of the impacting beam. The calculations
indicate that the target density around the beam axis can be reduced by more than a factor of 10 within
2.5 µs, because of the transverse shock wave moving outwards from the region heated by the beam. The
material in a 0.5 cm radius around the region heated by the beam is subject to substantial expansion.
The material in this hot inner zone is in a plasma state, with the surrounding target in a liquid state.
The density is reduced by a factor of 10 after only 100 LHC bunches out of 2808 have been delivered.
The protons in the following bunches will therefore penetrate into the target more deeply as they will
encounter material with reduced density. The penetration depth is estimated at up to 40 m.
6 Principles of machine protection
Protect the machine: the highest priority is clearly to avoid any damage to accelerator equipment.
Protect the beam: The objective is to maximize beam time, but complex protection systems
reduce the availability of the machine. The number of ‘false’ interlocks stopping operation must be
minimized. This is a trade-off between protection and operation. A ‘false’ interlock is dened as an
interlock that stops operation even though there is no risk (example: a temperature sensor reading a
wrong value, therefore switching off the power converter of a magnet and stopping beam operation).
Provide the evidence: If the protection systems stop operation (e.g., dump the beam or inhibit in-
jection), clear diagnostics should be provided [26]. If something goes wrong (leading to damage, but also
a near miss), it should be possible to understand the event. This needs synchronized transient recording
of all the important parameters in all relevant systems, as well as long-term logging of parameters with
reduced frequency (such as 1 Hz). Examples are the current in all magnets, beam position, beam losses





7 Classification of failures
Failure of accelerator equipment: power converter trips, magnet quenches, AC distribution fail-
ures (e.g., as a consequence of a thunderstorm), objects in the vacuum chamber, vacuum leaks, trip of
the RF system, spontaneous ring of a kicker magnet, etc.
Failure of the controls system: wrong parameter sent to equipment such as a wrong magnet
current or a wrong magnet current function, trigger problem, failure in the timing system, failure in the
feedback system, ring of a kicker magnet at the wrong time or with the wrong strength.
Failure during operation: wrong manipulation of chromaticity, tune or orbit, etc.
Beam instability: for example due to too high beam or bunch current, with typical time constant
of many milliseconds to seconds.
In order to calculate the risk of a failure, the probability of the occurrence and the damage potential
need to be estimated. For the design of the protection system, the time constant of the failure as well as
the time constant for beam loss due to the failure need to be known.
8 Time constant for beam losses
8.1 Ultra fast beam losses
Sources of failures that lead to a beam loss within very short time, typically in the range of ns to µs:
 failures of kicker magnets (during injection, at extraction, for special kicker magnets for beam
diagnostics);
 beam transfer via transfer lines between different accelerators and from the accelerator to a target
station. The target could be for secondary particle production or the beam dump block. A common
example of such a failure is a wrong setting of a magnet in the line that leads to a deection of the
beam into the vacuum chamber;
 too small beam size at a target station. Targets for high intensity beams are designed for a certain
beam size. If the beam size is much smaller, for example due to a wrong optics, the target or the
window in front of the target could be damaged.
8.2 Very fast beam losses
Sources for failures that lead to a very fast beam loss (typically in the range of ms) are multiturn beam
losses in a circular accelerator due to a large number of possible failures, mostly in the powering system
of the main magnets, with a typical time constant of some 10 turns to many seconds.
8.3 Fast beam losses
Fast beam loss (some 10 ms to seconds) can have many different origins: failures in the magnet powering
system, vacuum valves that close, trips of the RF acceleration system, beam instabilities, failures in the
control system, etc.
8.4 Slow beam losses
Slow beam losses (many seconds) can have many different origins: high vacuum pressure, failures in the
powering system for corrector magnets, wrong parameter, RF, etc. The main difference between slow and
fast losses is that the operation crew could still be involved in the decision on how to continue operation




9 Strategy for protection
The best strategy is to prevent a specic failure from happening. As an example, fast diagnostic kicker
magnets that could deect the beams into the vacuum chamber wall should only be installed in high
intensity machines if they are indispensable.
Failure should be detected as early as possible, with priority at the hardware level. For most
failures, this allows stopping beam operation before the beam is affected. This requires monitoring of
the hardware (such as state signals, parameters, etc.). As an example, a trip of a magnet power converter
should be detected as early as possible.
When a failure is detected, beam operation must be stopped. For synchrotrons and storage rings
the beam is extracted by a fast kicker magnet into a beam dump block. Injection must be stopped.
Detecting failures at the hardware level is not always possible or might be too slow. Therefore a
detection when the beam starts to be affected by a failure should be considered. This requires reliable
beam instrumentation.
In general, the commissioning of the accelerator starts with low intensity beam (‘pilot beam’).
Also during re-commissioning, or after a period without beam it might be necessary to restart with low
intensity beams.
10 Active and passive protection
Active protection starts with the detection of the failure (for example, a failure of a power con-
verter) or the consequences on the beam when it starts to be affected by the failure (for example, increased
beam losses or a different orbit). The beam must be turned off as soon as possible. This can be done in
different ways, for example by switching off the source or the RF system. In the case of an accelerator
complex with a chain of several accelerators, injection of beam into the next stage of the accelerator
complex should be prevented in case of failure. When beam is stored in a synchrotron or storage ring,
the beam must be extracted onto a target that can accept the beam pulse without being damaged (beam
dump).
Passive protection: there is a certain class of failures (e.g., ultra fast losses) when active protection
is not possible, for example, protection against misring of an injection or extraction kicker magnet. A
beam absorber or collimator is required to stop the mis-kicked beam in order to avoid damage. All
possible beam trajectories in such case must be considered, and the absorber must be designed to absorb
the beam energy without being damaged.
11 Protection systems
There can be a large number of protection systems:
 systems to monitor the correct operation of the hardware;
 beam instrumentation to measure if the beam parameters are in the correct range;
 a beam dumping system, in general including a fast kicker magnet and absorber block, possibly a
transfer line between kicker and absorber block;
 collimators and beam absorbers;
 an electronic system (beam interlock system) that links the different protection system. It ensures
that the beam is extracted from a synchrotron, injection is stopped, and RF acceleration might be




12 Design considerations for protection systems
There are several principles that should be considered in the design of protection systems, although it
might not be possible to follow all these principles in all cases.
 If the protection system does not work, it is better to stop operation rather than continue and risk
damaging equipment.
 Failsafe design: in case of a failure in the protection system, protection functionalities should
not be compromised. As an example, if the cable that triggers the extraction kicker of the beam
dumping system is disconnected, operation must stop. For synchrotrons, the kicker must re.
 Detection of internal faults: the protection system must monitor the internal status. In case of an
internal fault, the fault should be reported. If the fault is critical, operation must be stopped.
 Remote testing is desired, for example between two runs. This allows verication of the correct
status of the system.
 Critical equipment should be redundant (possibly diverse redundancy, with the same or similar
functions executed by different systems).
 Critical processes for protection should not rely on complex software running under an operating
system and requiring the general computer network.
 It should not be possible to remotely change the most critical parameters. If parameters need to be
changed, the changes must be controlled, logged, and password protection should ensure that only
authorized personnel can do the change.
 Safety, availability, and reliability of the systems should be demonstrated. This is possible by using
established methods to analyze critical systems and to predict failure rates.
 Operate the protection systems early on before they become critical, to gain experience and to
build up condence. This could be done before beam operation, or during early beam operation
when the beam intensity is low.
13 Managing interlocks
In large complex accelerators with high beam currents it is unavoidable to have many interlocks. In
particular during commissioning when operating with limited beam power, the disabling of interlocks is
common practice. However, it is vital to keep track of such disabled interlocks.
For the LHC the disabling of a selected number of interlocks is possible for low intensity / low
energy beams. When the beam energy or intensity increase above damage level, the interlocks are auto-
matically enabled.
14 Beam instrumentation for machine protection
Beam instrumentation plays an important role in machine protection, to monitor beam parameters and
stop beam operation if a parameter is outside a predened range. If machine protection relies on the
correct operation of beam instruments, failures in the beam instrumentation need to be considered.
14.1 Beam loss monitors: BLMs
BLMs are used for monitoring beam losses as well as for machine protection.
If used for protection, BLMs measure beam losses along the accelerator and stop beam operation
in case of too high losses. It is important that the monitors cover the entire accelerator and there is no




The monitors should be fast, for LHC down to 40 µs, in order to detect beam losses in time to stop
operation. They should be designed such that they can trigger a beam dump and stop operation before
very fast beam losses damage equipment.
Failure case: BLMs provide no or too low readings due to a defect and therefore cannot provide
a signal to dump the beam in case of high beam losses. The trigger threshold could be incorrect. If the
threshold is too high, the beam will not be dumped, this could be dangerous. A correct setting of the
trigger threshold is vital.
14.2 Beam position monitors: BPMs
BPMs ensure that the beam has the correct orbit. In most cases the beam should be centred in the
aperture.
There are some exceptions, for example for extracting beams from an accelerator. The beam must
have an offset, e.g., a closed orbit bump is applied to position the beam close to a septum magnet. This
must work reliably, otherwise the extracted beam might hit equipment. BPMs monitor the amplitude of
such bumps and are effectively redundant monitors of the magnet current in the closed orbit dipoles.
Failure case: BPMs can have a constant offset independent of the beam position. If a feedback for
the closed orbit is used, the feedback tries to correct the suspected wrong position. A closed-orbit bump
develops and beam touches the aperture. Even if the protection systems work correctly and the beam is
dumped, there is some risk. The kicker for the beam dumping system might disturb the trajectory of part
of the beam that could touch the aperture and cause damage.
14.3 Beam current monitors
If the beam transmission between two locations of the accelerator complex is too low (if the beam is lost
somewhere between): stop beam operation. If the beam lifetime in a synchroton or storage rings is too
short: dump the beam.
Failure case: in case of no reading or too low a reading in the presence of a high intensity beam,
there is the risk of extracting a high intensity beam towards an external beam line, into the next part of
the accelerator chain, or onto a target. In case the intensity reading is too high, beam losses might go
unnoticed.
14.4 Beam size monitors
The monitor ensures correct beam size.
Failure case: If the beam size is too small and the monitor does not correctly detect it, this could be
dangerous for windows and targets during extraction, and could also underestimate the damage potential
of the circulating beam.
15 Machine protection at SNS
SNS is an accelerator with a normal conducting linac as well as a superconducting linac. The beam is
then accumulated in an accumulator ring, and sent via transfer lines to a target station. The beam power
onto the target will be 1.4 MW, with a beam pulse length of 1 ms and a repetition rate of 60 Hz. Since
the beam is more or less continuous, the deposited energy in case of mis-steered beam is proportional
to the time of exposure. The risk of possible damage increases with time, and protection is ensured by
detecting the failure and stopping injection and accumulation.
The damage limit for a copper cavity has been calculated: the time to reach the thermal stress for
copper assuming a beam size of 2 mm, a current of 36 mA, and a maximum permitted energy density of






















































Fig. 4: Energy stored in the beams for different accelerators (based on a figure by R. Assmann)
The SNS machine protection system uses inputs from beam loss monitors, beam current monitors,
the RF system, power supplies, vacuum system, kickers etc.
16 Machine protection at the LHC
A Livingston type plot (Fig. 4) shows the energy stored in the beam as a function of particle momentum.
The LHC will operate with 2808 bunches, each bunch with a nominal intensity of 1011 protons.
Machine protection is required during all phases of operation since the LHC is the rst accelerator with
the intensity of the injected beam already far above the threshold for damage. Protection during the
injection process is mandatory. It is striking that the energy stored in the LHC beam at injection is about
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Fig. 5: Schematic layout of the beam transfer from the SPS to the LHC and CNGS
At 7 TeV, fast beam loss with an intensity of about 5% of one single ‘nominal bunch’ could
damage equipment (e.g., superconducting coils).
The only component that can stand a loss of the full beam is the beam dump block. All other
components would be severely damaged. The LHC beams must always be extracted into the beam dump
blocks at the end of a ll and in case of failure.
During powering, about 10 GJ is stored in the superconducting magnets; quench protection and
powering interlocks must be operational long before starting beam operation.
16.1 LHC: strategy for machine protection
The strategy for LHC machine protection reects many of the principles that have been discussed so far.
 Denition of aperture by collimators.
 Early detection of failure of equipment acting on beams generates a beam dump request, possibly
before the beam is affected.
 Active monitoring of the beam parameters with beam instruments detects abnormal beam condi-
tions and generates beam dump requests within a single machine turn.
 Reliable transmission of beam dump requests from a large variety of systems to the beam dumping
system. An active signal is required for operation; the absence of the signal is considered as a beam
dump request and injection inhibit.
 Reliable operation of the beam dumping system for dump requests or internal faults, safely ex-
tracting the beams onto external dump blocks.
 Passive protection by beam absorbers and collimators for specic cases of failure.
16.2 Protection for beam transfer from the SPS to the LHC and CNGS
Figure 5 shows the SPS (the pre-injector), the transfer lines, LHC injection and CNGS (CNGS includes
a target station for producing neutrinos). Up to 288 bunches will be transferred from the SPS to the LHC
during one fast extraction, each bunch with 1.1 × 1011 protons. This intensity at 450 GeV is far above




Failures during the beam transfer from the SPS to the LHC or to CNGS include failures of the SPS
extraction kicker and LHC injection kicker, such as wrong deection angle or wrong timing.
The orbit bump around the extraction point in the SPS during extraction is monitored with tight
tolerances. The magnet currents (slow pulsing magnets and fast pulsing magnets) and the beam positions
are veried just before extraction.
After extraction, the trajectory is determined by the magnet elds: safe beam transfer and injection
relies on correct settings and no objects should block the beam passage. In the transfer line the vacuum
valves, beam screen, etc. must all be out. The energy of the SPS, the transfer lines, and the LHC must
match.
All settings are veried just before extraction from the SPS and injection into the LHC. A signal
‘extraction permit’ is required to extract beam from the SPS and another signal ‘injection permit’ to
inject beam into the LHC.
The position of collimators and beam absorbers in the SPS, the transfer lines and the LHC injection
region must be set correctly to protect in case of kicker misring.
The LHC must be ready to accept beam. Injection uses the ‘probe beam’ concept: only when
beam is circulating in the LHC is injection of a high intensity beam permitted. This is a verication of
all LHC magnet settings and ensures that the aperture is free. The low-intensity beam is replaced by a
full SPS batch.
16.3 Multiturn losses
A typical consequence of a magnet powering failure is growth of the closed orbit everywhere. In case of
a quadrupole failure (or a higher order magnet), the beam size explodes. The time constant until the beam
is affected can be very short, in particular if a normal conducting magnet trips or after a superconducting
magnet quenches. The effect of such failures can be detected at any location of a circular accelerator,
and downstream of the failing magnet in a linac.
Local orbit bump: such a bump is generated by several dipole magnets, and can be the consequence
of a beam position monitor with an offset or a powering failure. The building up of a closed bump is in
general slow, but it can be detected only locally.
Protection relies on equipment monitoring and beam monitoring and on dumping the beam after
the failure is detected.
16.4 Beam loss monitors
Beam loss monitors (BLMs) are installed at each quadrupole magnet of the LHC (more than 3500 gas
ionization chambers and 400 secondary emission monitors) and all aperture limitations around the ma-
chine, in particular at the collimators [27].
The reaction time is of the order of one turn. The monitors have a very large dynamic range (larger
than 106) in order to dump the beam in case of very small beam losses that could quench magnets. For
the BLMs that will be installed in the superconducting part of the LHC, the threshold will be adjusted in
order to request a beam dump before the beam loss quenches a magnet.
16.5 Fast magnet current change monitors
A failure in normal conducting magnets can lead to a change of the magnet current and to beam losses
in a very short time. To detect fast powering failures in a sufciently short time, a device developed for
HERA is being adapted for the LHC [28]. This instrument is able to detect current changes at the level of
0.03% within about 0.7 ms for the LHC, and at the level of 0.1% within 50 µs for the extraction septum
magnets that are used for beam transfer from the SPS to the LHC. The consequences of thunderstorms





















Fig. 6: Layout of the beam dumping systems, for both LHC beams (courtesy M. Gyr)
monitors which are used for 15 of the electrical circuits with the most critical magnets. The monitors
also ensure that the conditions for beam injection or extraction are correct just before the ring of kicker
magnets by monitoring the current in the septum magnets.
16.6 LHC beam dumping system
The role of the LHC beam dumping system [29] is to safely dispose of the beam when beam operation
must be interrupted for any reason. Fifteen fast kicker magnets with a pulse rise-time of less than 3 µs
deect the beam by an angle of 280 µrad in the horizontal plane, see Fig. 6. To ensure that all particles
are extracted from the LHC, the beam has a particle-free abort gap with a length of 3 µs corresponding
to the kicker rise-time. The extraction kickers are triggered such that the eld increases from zero to
the nominal value during this gap when there should be no particles. Downstream of the kickers the
beam is deected vertically by 2.4 mrad towards the beam dump block by 15 septum magnets. A short
distance further downstream, 10 diluter kicker magnets are used to paint the bunches in both horizonal
and vertical directions to reduce the beam density on the dump block. The beam is transferred through
a 700 m long extraction line to increase the transverse r.m.s. beam size from approximately 0.2 mm to
1.5 mm and to spread the bunches further on the dump block.
The overall shape is produced by the deection of the extraction and dilution kickers. For nominal
beam parameters, the maximum temperature in the beam dump block is expected to be in the order of
about 800◦C.
16.7 LHC collimation system
Collimators will protect the machine against quenches and damage. The role of the collimation system
is to capture a large fraction of the particles with large amplitudes that would otherwise be lost around




Because of the very high stored energy in the beams, the LHC will be the rst accelerator requiring
collimators to dene the mechanical aperture throughout the entire magnetic cycle. For efcient beam
cleaning, a large number of collimators (about 43 per beam) are located at specic phase advance loca-
tions and are adjusted to dene an opening corresponding to between 5 and 9 σ, with σ the r.m.s. beam
size at the collimator.
In case of equipment failure, collimators will be the rst devices to intercept the beam and must
absorb part of the energy until the beams are extracted.
Studies of possible failure scenarios showed that up to about 5 bunches at 7 TeV can impact on
a collimator jaw in case of beam dump pre-ring, or up to 288 bunches for a failure at injection. The
simulated increase of the temperature indicates that materials such as aluminium or copper cannot be
used. Only very light materials with a low number of protons in the nucleus (low-Z materials) would not
be damaged.
16.8 SPS and LHC beam interlock systems
Many systems monitor equipment or beam parameters, detect failures, and send a hardwired signal to the
beam interlock system (the so-called user permit signal) [31]. The beam interlock system combines user
permit signals and produces a general beam permit. The beam permit is a hardwired signal to injection
and extraction kickers.
 For the LHC ring: the absence of a beam permit triggers a beam dump and blocks injection.
 For injection into the LHC: the absence of a beam permit blocks injection.
 For extraction from the SPS: the absence of a beam permit blocks extraction.
16.9 Other systems
The machine protection and controls software interlock systems (SIS) provide additional protection for
complex but also less critical conditions [32]. One task of the SIS is the surveillance of magnet currents
to avoid certain failures (e.g., local bumps) that would reduce the aperture. The reaction time of these
systems will be at the level of a few seconds. The systems rely entirely on the computer network,
databases, etc., clearly not as safe as hardware systems!
The sequencer is a program that executes dened, well-tested procedures for beam operation.
Logging and post mortem systems record data for both continuous logging data and transients data
(beam dump, quench, etc.). After beam operation has been stopped by the protection systems one needs
to understand what happened. In particular, the correct functioning of the protection systems must be
demonstrated.
17 Beam instrumentation wish list
For machine protection, very reliable and robust instrumentation is of the utmost importance, using
design principles from the design of protection systems (redundancy, fail-safe, the reliability should be
quantied).
The objective is an availability of 99.99%, not only for machines such as the LHC, but also for
future projects (extremely high reliability of beam instrumentation is required for some projects, e.g., the
energy amplier).
The most important instruments for machine protection are beam loss monitors, beam position
monitors, and beam current transformers.
In some cases compromises between performance and robustness should be considered, since




High up on the wish list is a very fast beam current change monitor detecting changes of the beam
current accurately in a very short time. A monitor detecting a loss of 1010 protons for the LHC within
one or a few turns, to trigger a beam dump would be extremely useful. Such a device would efciently
be redundant to 4000 BLMs for protection from damage.
18 Conclusions
There is a signicant increase of papers on machine protection during particle accelerators conferences,
from a few papers per conference in the 1990s to more than 50 papers in recent conferences.
Machine protection goes far beyond equipment protection and across many systems. It requires
the understanding of many different type of failures that could lead to beam loss. It requires fairly
comprehensive understanding of all aspects of the accelerator (accelerator physics, operation, equipment,
instrumentation) and touches many aspects of accelerator construction and operation.
Machine protection is becoming increasingly important for future projects, with increased beam
power and energy density (W/mm2 or J/mm2) and more complex machines.
Beam instrumentation plays a vital role. Many failures can only be detected by beam monitoring,
and highly reliable instruments are required.
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